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Abstract
Financial ratios such as leverage or indices based on firm characteristics (Kaplan-
Zingales, Whited-Wu, Hadlock-Pierce) have been used to measure whether a firm
has too much debt. Let’s assume a firm does not have any debt. Does this ‘choice’
reflect financial strength or exclusion? To measure the latter, this paper develops
a theory to estimate the value of financial constraints. Based on a strictly con-
cave production function, firms that face financial constraints take longer to reach
their steady-state. This added time diminishes firm value, which translates into a
shadow price of relaxing financial constraints.
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1. Introduction
Improving firms’ access to finance has become a major policy goal, and a
growing literature on measuring financial inclusion has emerged (Chakravarty and
Pal, 2013; Mailou et al., 2017; Sarma and Pais, 2011). Many measures rely on sur-
veys but they are limited in terms of coverage and responses (e.g. binary variables)
(World Bank, 2014).1 Firm-level secondary data sources such as Compustat of-
1Binary responses include whether a firm has a bank account or not.
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fer better coverage (e.g. number of firms and time periods). These data sources
provide financial information, which can be used to derive ratios such as lever-
age or indices based on firm characteristics (e.g. Kaplan-Zingales, Whited-Wu)
(Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Whited and Wu, 2006). However, Farre-Mensa and
Ljungqvist (2016) outline the empirical challenges of measuring financial con-
straints. Financial ratios are difficult to interpret as low levels of debt could signal
financial exclusion (Kling, 2018). Recently, alternative methods have be consid-
ered such as textual analysis from annual reports to identify firms facing financial
constraints (Buehlmaier and Whited, 2018; Hoberg and Maksimovic, 2015). Yet,
these methods rely on firms’ willingness to disclose their financial difficulties.
Another empirical approach uses the reduction in firms profitability due to bind-
ing budget constraints, which limit the acquisition of inputs, to quantify financial
constraints (Cherchye et al., 2020). Their empirical approach considers a set of
inputs, derives optimal production and assesses the deviation from an optimal al-
location of inputs due to a lack of funding.
This paper focuses on finance as the ultimate input that allows the purchase
of all required inputs for production. It develops a model to quantify the value of
financial constraints. The idea is that firms without access to finance cannot grow
fast enough to reach their steady-state. This growth constraint has a value in the
form of the shadow price λ. Firms can raise capital through debt or equity finance,
which shifts budget constraints instantaneously. This ‘lumpy’ nature of external
financing is captured using a deterministic impulse control framework.
An alternative theoretical approach to quantify ‘lost growth opportunities’
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refers to real option theory. A recent study in this strand of literature by Bolton
et al. (2019) considers different growth phases of the firm. A real option approach
requires the assumption that cash flows or earnings follow a geometric Brownian
motion. Empirically and theoretically, this assumption can be challenged as it im-
plicitly assumes that cash flows or earnings are exogenous, i.e. independent from
management decisions (Kling, 2018). The model setting is discrete in the sense
that there exists a growth phase and a mature phase. Firms switch from the growth
to the mature phase after exercising an investment option. Hence, this theoretical
approach does not derive a steady-state or a time into steady-state endogenously.
The main contribution of this paper is threefold. First, the paper solves a
deterministic impulse control problem with state dependent continuous control
constraints. Impulses shift the state variable, altering subsequent continuous con-
trol constraints, making established methods difficult to apply.2 The insight is to
express the functional as the present value of a steady state perpetuity shown in
Theorem 1. This theorem can be applied to other theoretical models involving de-
terministic impulse controls. Second, Corollary 1 determines the value of financial
constraints analytically for the production function f (K) = Kα with 0 < α < 1.
Hence, the value of financial constraints refers to a shadow price λ, which is the
value of relaxing the growth constraint through debt or equity issues. Corollary
1 could be used as an input for further theoretical work, requiring endogenous
2There are two approaches to solve deterministic impulse control problems: the maximum
principle Fleming and Rishel (1975), Rempala and Zabczyk (1988) and quasi-variational inequal-
ities Bensoussan and Lions (1980). Yet, many applications violate sufficient conditions Chahim
et al. (2011).
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measures of financial constraints. Third, an empirical specification of Corollary
1 could derive a measure of financial constraints, defined as ‘slow growth into a
steady-state’, by estimating a production function.
2. The model
The model is set in a deterministic world without market frictions and con-
tinuous time. Equity holders maximize future discounted free cash flows paid
to equity holders. Investment I drives capital stock K, which determines gross
cash flows through a strictly concave production function f (K). Investment has
to be financed through cash flows generated from existing capital stock, which
determines control constraints captured in the feasible set ΩI . The optimal control
problem is shown in (1). To simplify notation, we omit the argument time except
if we refer to a specific point in time. Capital stock K is the state variable, invest-
ment I is the continuous control variable, E(t j) are impulse controls and δ(t j − t)
refer to Dirac delta functions, which take the value one if t = t j and zero other-
wise. We follow Sethi and Thompson (2006) by treating debt and equity issues as
impulse controls that affect the state variable, capital stock K, directly, and not via
the control constraint of the continuous control variable. The equity holders can
be regarded as entrepreneurs with limited funds financing the initial capital stock
K(0) = K0. They have monopolistic access to an idea or technology that allows
them to translate capital stock K into gross cash flows.
Impulses can occur at n points. Costs associated with the magnitudes and tim-
ings of impulses affect the functional directly and also the feasible set ΩI denoted
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c(E(t1), . . . , E(tn), t1, . . . , tn) ≥ 0, e.g. interest expenses. Capital stock cannot be-
come negative as the minimum change is zero, the lower bound of the control









( f (K) − I − c(E(t1), . . . , E(tn), t1, . . . , tn))e−itdt
)
K̇ = I +
n∑
j=1
δ(t j − t)E(t j),K(0) = K0
I ∈ ΩI = [0, f (K) − c(E(t1), . . . , E(tn), t1, . . . , tn)] (1)
The idea is to rewrite problem (1) as a discounted stead-state cash flow. First,
determine the optimal investment plan {I}∞0 by setting E(t1) = . . . = E(tn) =
0. Second, derive the steady state capital stock K̄. Third, establish the optimal
path of the state variable K∗(t). Fourth, the time into steady state κ follows from
K∗(κ) = K̄. Fifth, show that there is only one impulse at t1 = 0+. Finally, solve a
standard optimization problem where the time into steady state κ depends on the
impulse E0+ . Theorem 1 summarizes the main finding, and Appendix A provides
the proof.
Theorem 1. The optimization problem (1) can be rewritten as follows, where












, K(0) < K̄
Theorem 1 generalizes the Irrelevance Theorem derived by Modigliani and
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Miller (1958) by adding e−iκ(E0+ ). Once the steady state is reached, i.e. κ = 0,
the model converges to Modigliani and Miller (1958). If firms cannot jump into
steady-state, i.e. κ > 0, access to finance has a value, which can be measured.
Firms with capital stocks below their steady state have an incentive to invest their
internal cash flow as the marginal return on capital exceeds the cost of equity.
Hence, the growth constraint is binding, and relaxing this constraint through debt
or equity issues adds value.
3. The value of financial constraints
Using standard methods (e.g. translog cost model), f (K) can be estimated,
which then permits an estimate of λ based on (A.6) and (A.7). This shadow price
gives the value of relaxing the growth constraint.This is a different measure com-
pared to financial ratios as it focuses on the lack of opportunity to grow quickly.
To illustrate this approach, we select f (K) = Kα with 0 < α < 1, which provides a
closed from solution of the value of financial constraints denoted λ(t). Appendix
B provides the proof.
Corollary 1. Setting f (K) = Kα with 0 < α < 1 yields an analytic solution of the






ei(t−κ) − 1, for 0 ≤ t ≤ κ (2)
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4. Conclusion
Traditionally, the finance literature has adopted two definitions of financial
constraints. First, the inelasticity of the supply of capital suggests that constrained
firms face high cost of capital for additional borrowing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981;
Whited and Wu, 2006). Second, in line with Fazzari et al. (1987) financial con-
straints can be measured by the difference between firms’ opportunity cost of in-
ternal capital and their cost of external capital. This paper follows an alternative
perspective focusing on measuring the slowness of firms’ growth due to their lack
of access to external finance. This idea is related to recent empirical work by
Cherchye et al. (2020); however, their approach considers a reduction in firms’
profitability due to their inability to acquire inputs as a measure of financial con-
straints.
Using a deterministic impulse control setup, this paper derives a measure of
firms’ financial exclusion. Firms face a growth constraint if they do not have
sufficient access to external finance; hence, they cannot reach their steady-state
instantaneously. This delay results in a loss in firm value as indicated by Theorem
1. Hence, the model can estimate the value of financial constraints based on the
shadow price λ. Empirically, theoretical predictions could be tested based on
Corollary 1, which assumes a simplified production function f (K) = Kα with
0 < α < 1. Taking logs on both sides provides a suitable regression equation,
which can identify α. As derived in the proof of Corollary in Appendix B, the
steady-state capital stock can be estimated using cost of capital denoted i and the
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estimated α. The time into steady state κ follows from equation B.2. Hence, the
shadow price can be estimated using the current capital stock as a proxy for K∗(t).
As the main aim is to derive a closed-form expression for financial constraints,
assumptions have to be imposed. Obviously, the true production function does de-
viate from f (K) = Kα, and market frictions (e.g. tax shields) have implications
for the steady-state capital stock depending on whether firms have access to debt
finance. However, Theorem 1 holds in general for any deterministic impulse con-
trol problem as defined in equation 1. A closed-form expression for financial
constraints is only possible if assumptions are made as in Corollary 1. Future
research could explore empirical tests of Corollary 1, which might offer an alter-
native measure of financial exclusion.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
Setting E(t1) = . . . = E(tn) = 0 implying c(E(t1), . . . , E(tn), t1, . . . , tn) = 0 in
(1), the current value Hamiltonian H (A.1) is linear in the control variable I, the
solution is bang-bang limited by control constraints and triggered by the shadow
price Ψ.
H = f (K) − I + ΨI (A.1)
Growth occurs if Ψ(0) > 1 as dH/dI > 0 implying that the firm has not
reached its steady-state yet. In the steady-state at time t = κ, growth stops, i.e.
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Ψ(κ) = 1. Thus, the optimal investment policy refers to (A.2).
I∗(t) =

f (K) for 0 ≤ t < κ
undefined for t ≥ κ
(A.2)





dK = t, for 0 ≤ t < κ (A.3)






= f ′(K̄) = −Ψ̇(κ) + iΨ(κ) = i (A.4)
Using the steady state capital stock K̄ from (A.4) and the initial capital stock
K(0) = K0, we solve (A.3) and determine the time into steady state κ. After es-
tablishing the optimal time paths of investment and capital stock and determining
the time to steady state κ, we use the full Lagrangian L to derive the time paths of
shadow prices by converting the control constraints ΩI into inequality constraints.
The inequality constraint of the lower bound is not binding as K0 < K̄; hence, it is
dropped. The Lagrangian (A.5), optimality condition (A.6) and costate equation
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(A.7) are as follows.
L = f (K) − I + ΨI + λ( f (K) − I) (A.5)
∂L
∂I
= −1 + Ψ − λ = 0 (A.6)
∂L
∂K
= f ′(K) + λ f ′(K) = −Ψ̇ + iΨ (A.7)
From the optimality condition (A.6), we derive the shadow price λ(t) ex-
pressed in terms of Ψ(t). The shadow price λ(t) measures the marginal benefit
of relaxing the growth constraint.
Relaxing the condition E(t1) = . . . = E(tn) = 0, only one impulse at t1 = 0+
occurs as ∂λ
∂t < 0, which implies that the best time to relax the growth constraint
is at t1 = 0+. From (A.6) λ = Ψ − 1 into (A.7) gives Ψ̇ = Ψ(i − f ′(K)) < 0
for t < κ ⇒ ∂λ
∂t < 0. Hence, there is one impulse E(0
+) at t = 0+, which shifts
the initial condition K(0+) = K(0) + E(0+) reducing the time into steady state
κ(E(0+)). Hence, deriving optimality conditions under the assumption E(t1) =
. . . = E(tn) = 0 is valid as only one impulse occurs, and this impulse can be
regarded as a change in the initial condition K(0+). Optimal investment I∗ in
(A.2) refers to a step function; hence, the functional V = 0 for t < κ and at t = κ
the steady state is reached resulting in a perpetuity discounted back to t = 0.
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Appendix B. Proof of Corollary 1







(1 − α)t + K1−α0
] 1
1−α (B.1)














(1 − α)κ + K1−α0
] 1
1−α







Fourth, derive Ψ(t) using (A.7) and (A.6), i.e. λ = Ψ − 1, where C is an arbitrary
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constant.
Ψ fK = −Ψ̇ + iΨ
Ψ̇
Ψ
= i − αK∗(t)α−1
lnΨ = it −
∫
αK∗(t)α−1dt
Using (B.1), we can write K∗(t)α−1 as a function of time.
lnΨ = it − α
∫
1
(1 − α)t + K1−α0
dt
lnΨ = it − α
ln
(









(1 − α)t + K1−α0
)
+ C
Fifth, express Ψ in terms of K∗(t).
lnΨ = it −
α
1 − α
ln (K∗(t))1−α + C
lnΨ = it − α ln K∗(t) + C
To determine the constant C, we use the conditions in the steady state Ψ = 1, t = κ
and K∗(κ) = K̄.
C = α ln K̄ − iκ
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Finally, we obtain a closed-form solution for the time path of the shadow price
Ψ(t) and λ(t).
lnΨ = i(t − κ) − α
(
ln K∗(t) − ln K̄
)
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